We develop a theoretical framework to study illicit drugs markets and we estimate it using data on purchases of crack cocaine. Buyers are searching for high-quality drugs, but they determine drugs' quality (i.e., their purity) only after consuming them. Hence, sellers can rip off first-time buyers or can offer higher-quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again. In equilibrium, a distribution of qualities persists. The estimated model implies that sellers' moral hazard reduces the average and increases the dispersion of drug purity. Moreover, increasing penalties may increase the purity and affordability of the drugs traded because doing so increases sellers' relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first-time buyers. * We are grateful to Nicola Pavoni and many seminar audiences for useful comments and discussions. Mi Luo and Simon Mongey provided excellent research assistance.
Introduction
How do markets for illicit commodities, such as narcotics, differ from regular markets?
What would happen to the consumption and prices of narcotics if their trade were legalized?
How do changes in the intensity of enforcement affect them?
We study these questions by building and estimating a model that focuses on pervasive moral hazard as the distinguishing characteristic of the retail market for illicit drugs-i.e., the "cutting" of drugs. 1 We quantify the effects of sellers' moral hazard on the quality and consumption of drugs, providing potential insights into how market outcomes might differ under legalization. We note that the presence of moral hazard leads to counter-intuitive implications for policing.
We model a market with unobserved quality, search frictions and repeated trade. Buyers with heterogeneous taste for drugs search for sellers with heterogeneous costs of supplying drugs. Buyers meet new sellers randomly and cannot observe drug purity before consuming it-i.e., illicit drugs are experience goods. Following the key insight of Galenianos et al. (2012) , quality is non-contractible, creating a moral hazard problem; this is the key way in which the model captures an illegal market, in which there are no institutions to enforce quality standards. 2 Buyers sample sellers until they find one who offers a sufficiently-high level of quality, at which point they return to this preferred seller. The buyer-seller relationship persists until either the buyer meets a new seller who offers higher-quality drugs or an exogenous shock (e.g., policing) severs it.
Buyers' inability to ascertain drug quality creates a trade-off for sellers. On the one hand, moral hazard: sellers can offer low-quality drugs, thereby maximizing instantaneous profits. On the other hand, long-term relationships: sellers can offer high-quality drugs that induce buyers to purchase from them again, thereby increasing their customer base. Hence, long-term relationships are the principal counterweight to the moral hazard problem inherent in illegal markets. In equilibrium, a distribution of quality levels persists: high-cost sellers rip their (first-time) buyers off by offering zero-purity drugs, whereas low-cost sellers offer high-quality drugs to attract long-term customers.
In our quantitative analysis, we estimate the model combining two distinct datasets that provide key pieces of information on the crack cocaine market in the U.S.: 1) the distribution of drug qualities offered in the market; 2) the proportion of buyers who purchase from their regular sellers; and 3) buyers' frequency of drug purchases, including the difference in purchase frequency between those who buy from regular sellers and those who buy from new sellers. The model fits the data well, and the estimation reveals that the key elements of our model play an important role in the crack-cocaine market. Specifically, search frictions are non-trivial: a buyer meets a new seller, on average, approximately every 25 days.
Relationships between buyers and sellers are quite short-lived: they exogenously end, on average, every 40 days. Nonetheless, regular buyers are valuable to sellers, as they consume very frequently-on average, approximately 19 times per month-confirming that frequent users account for the vast majority of crack cocaine purchases (Kilmer et al., 2014) . Overall, search and information frictions imply a large dispersion of drug qualities. Finally, the estimates imply that sellers' profits are extremely skewed, with very few (low-cost) sellers reaping substantial profits and most sellers earning less than the minimum wage, consistent with the descriptive evidence reported by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) .
We use our parameter estimates to perform two counterfactual analyses. First, we quantify the importance of imperfect observability of drug quality and moral hazard for market outcomes. Since we posit that pervasive moral hazard is the defining characteristic of illegal markets, this counterfactual could provide some insights on how outcomes would differ if drugs markets were legal. 3 We modify our baseline model by assuming that buyers observe drug quality before making a purchase, thereby eliminating moral hazard. In the equilibrium of this counterfactual market, zero-purity drugs disappear, but quality dispersion persists due to search frictions. Quantitatively, average quality increases by 20 percent. Interestingly, the standard deviation of purity decreases by approximately 75 percent relative to the baseline case, implying that imperfect observability, rather than search frictions, mainly accounts for the dispersion of quality. 4 Overall, this change in the distribution of purity triggers an increase in the aggregate consumption of crack cocaine by approximately nine percent.
Our second counterfactual studies how penalties on buyers and sellers affect market outcomes. The motivation is that in the past 30 years the U.S. has markedly increased the enforcement and severity of drug laws-the so-called "war on drugs"-which has resulted in the tripling of arrests for drug-related offenses. 5 Interestingly, during the same period, drugs have become dramatically cheaper and purer. In our model, a lower enforcement may lead to lower drug quality. This counterintuitive result is the outcome of the interaction between moral hazard and long-term relationships. Lower enforcement on sellers increases their number. Hence, the rate at which buyers meet with new sellers increases and the expected duration of a buyer-seller relationships falls. Therefore, the profitability of cheating relative to that of establishing long-term relationships increases, which leads to more cheating and lower average quality. Quantitatively, we find that a 15-percent decrease in sellers' penalties leads to a 3.5-percent decrease in average quality (and similar results obtain when we reduce buyers' penalties). Hence, our analysis suggests that increasing penalties may have contributed to the observed increased purity and affordability of retail drugs in the U.S. Of course, the market for drugs has changed in many ways over time (among others, through economies of scale in the transportation of drugs to the U.S.); nonetheless, we find it interesting that our model is consistent with observed trends in the time-series.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 presents the theoretical model. Section 5 presents our quantitative analysis: we estimate the model, illustrate its main implications, and perform counterfactual analyses. Section 6 concludes. Appendices A and B collect all proofs and report the derivation of the density of buyers' preferences in the ADAM dataset, respectively. Appendix C further presents the details of the solution of the model with observable quality.
Related Literature
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. The first is the literature on illegal markets. Most theoretical models of illegal markets build on the traditional economic assumptions of perfect information and/or a centralized market: see, e.g., Becker et al. (2006) for an influential analysis and Bushway and Reuter (2008) for a review of this literature. 6 This framework, however, abstracts from two defining features of illicit markets on 5 At the same time the number of arrests for non-drug related offenses has barely changed (Kuziemko and Levitt, 2004) .
6 Notable exceptions are the discussion of information issues in drug markets in Reuter and Caulkins (2004) , and the analysis of limited information about drug accessibility in Jacobi and Sovinsky (2013). which we focus: moral hazard and search frictions. Hence, they cannot explain the extensive amount of cheating that we observe in the data and the implications it has for policy.
The second is the literature that studies firms' quality decisions when quality is not observable (or not contractible). To our knowledge, papers in this strand of literature examine markets for legal goods. Among the theoretical contributions, Gale and Rosenthal (1994) present a model in which buyers have to pay a cost before finding a high-quality seller.
Many empirical contributions have analyzed the role of quality certification and consumers' and suppliers' responses to it; for a thorough survey, see Dranove and Jin (2010) . Empirical analyses of moral hazard have focused mainly on the behavior of intermediaries; see, for example, Iizuka (2007 Iizuka ( , 2012 for the case of physicians and prescription drugs. Our paper examines the importance of moral hazard in the context of an illegal market, where search and matching frictions are pervasive, and innovates on previous descriptive empirical work by estimating a dynamic equilibrium model that allows a quantification of these effects on market outcomes.
Finally, this paper is also related to the empirical literature on the structural estimation of search models. Almost all empirical applications to product markets use static models: recent contributions include Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), Hong and Shum (2006) , Wildenbeest (2011), and Allen et al. (2014) . Notable exceptions are Cebul et al. (2011) , who use a dynamic search model to understand the role of buyers' turnover in health insurance pricing, and Gavazza (2013), who estimates a dynamic model of a decentralized asset market to study the effects of intermediaries on asset allocations and asset prices. Instead, we build a dynamic model that highlights the role of long-term buyer-seller relationships. 7 Most applications of dynamic search models focus on labor markets; Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007) provide an insightful survey of this literature and, within the labor-market context, Bontemps et al.
(1999) is the closest empirical paper. We innovate on all previous empirical contributions by quantifying the effects of an additional friction-i.e., the imperfect observability of product quality at the time of the transaction-and of its implications for how penalties affect market outcomes. 7 Hence, the paper also touches upon some of the issues that the literature on customer markets highlights. Most empirical investigations focus on markets for services, whereas we focus on a product market. See, for example, Boot (2000) for a survey of the literature on relationship banking.
Data
The available data dictate some of the modeling choices of this paper. For this reason we describe the data before presenting the model. This description also introduces some of the identification issues that we discuss in more detail in Section 5.2.
Data Sources
We combine two distinct datasets. The first is an extensive database on drug purchases.
The second is a survey that collects information about drug use among arrestees. We now describe each dataset in more detail. Arkes et al. (2008) show that these inconsistencies disappear almost entirely by controlling for the size of the transaction (above or below five grams). Hence, we restrict our analysis to transactions with a value below 200 constant 2003 dollars. 9 The number of these areas changes from years to year based on the availability of the data. From 2001 to 2003, it has been 33, 36 and 39, respectively. only about ten percent of the arrestees reject the interview request (Dave, 2008) . In addition to the interviews, participants provide urine samples, which are analyzed for validation of arrestees' self-reported drug use. Since 2000, the survey has included a drug market procurement module and collects information on the arrestee's most recent drug purchase for those who report having used drugs in the previous 30 days. Information collected includes the number of drug purchases in the past 30 days and whether arrestees last purchased drugs from their regular dealer. We have data from the 2001-2003 surveys. in Past 30 Days. The model will interpret this difference as different consumption rates between buyers who are currently matched to a seller and buyers who are currently not matched, taking into account that buyers will choose to match with a seller depending on their preferences for drugs.
STRIDE-The

Data Description
Overall, these two datasets provide a rich description of the retail crack-cocaine market 11 Galenianos et al. (2012) report that geographic and temporal variation is not large, contributing approximately 20 percent to the overall variation. and are well-suited for investigating the role of search frictions, imperfect observability, and buyer-seller relationships in this market. Specifically, our model interprets the dispersion of Pure Grams per $100 as originating from both search frictions and imperfect observability, thereby allowing us to calculate the contribution of each to the overall dispersion.
Moreover, the ADAM dataset is useful in measuring the frequency of buyer-seller long-term relationships and buyers' consumption rates. Since ADAM likely oversamples drug users, we will explicitly account for sample selection in our quantitative analysis.
With all their advantages, however, the datasets pose some challenges. Most importantly, both datasets are cross-sectional and, therefore, we do not observe buyers' and sellers' behavior over time. Specifically, we do not observe sellers transacting with several buyers or the dynamics of the terms of trade within individual buyer-seller relationships. These limitations imply that a model in which sellers discriminate between different buyers, while theoretically feasible, would be difficult to identify with the available data. Similarly, we do not observe whether sellers vary the quality of their offerings during their relationships with buyers, and theory argues that quality could either increase or decrease over time (Board and Meyer-ter Vehn, 2013) . Hence, in the absence of more-detailed measurement, our model will (successfully) match the available data by focusing on heterogeneity across sellers. We will discuss data limitations and their implications for our modeling assumptions further in Section 6.
The Model
Environment
Time runs continuously, the horizon is infinite and the future is discounted at rate r.
There is a continuum of potential buyers of measureB who are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for consuming drugs: buyers' marginal utility z of consuming drugs is distributed according to a continuous, connected and log-concave distributionM(·) with support [0,z]. Buyer heterogeneity may arise because of differences in innate preferences or the strength of addiction, as in Becker and Murphy (1988 imposed on traders (Becker et al., 2006) . We denote the measure of participating buyers by B. Buyers maximize their expected discounted utility.
There is a continuum of potential sellers of measureS who are heterogeneous with respect to their cost of providing quality drugs: seller's marginal cost c of providing quality is distributed according a continuous and connected distributionD(·) with support (0, ∞).
Seller heterogeneity might arise because of skill differentials or differences in connections with upstream suppliers. Each seller decides whether to participate in the market, in which case he pays flow cost K S . We denote the measure of participating sellers by S. Sellers maximize their steady-state profits.
The buyers and sellers who participate in the market meet and trade with each other.
At any point in time, a buyer is either matched with a seller (his regular seller) or he is unmatched. There are two types of meetings: new meetings, where a buyer and a seller meet for the first time, and repeat meetings, where a buyer meets with his regular seller. At a meeting, a transaction takes place, and, after a new meeting, the buyer decides whether or not to form a match with the new seller (see below).
In a transaction, the buyer pays a fixed price p and receives quality q, which corresponds to the pure quantity of drugs in the trade. A type-c seller has costs cq to supply drugs of quality q. At the time of the transaction, the buyer and seller both observe p, but the buyer does not observe quality q. After the transaction, the buyer consumes his purchase and perfectly learns q. The instantaneous utility that a type-z buyer receives from consuming quality q equals zq.
The main assumption about sellers' behavior is that, once they decide on the quality level to offer, they commit to that choice. That is, a seller supplies the same quality at all times, and, as a result, a buyer knows the quality that he will receive from a particular seller in the future after the first purchase from him. 13
After transacting with a new seller, the buyer decides whether to match with that seller.
Specifically, if the buyer is unmatched, he chooses whether to match with the seller or to remain unmatched; if the buyer is already matched with a different seller, he chooses whether to match with the new seller and sever the earlier match, or to return to his previous regular seller. Therefore, a match dissolves endogenously when a matched buyer participates in a new meeting and chooses to switch to the new seller. Additionally, a match dissolves at the exogenous rate δ, and the buyer becomes unmatched. the rate at which a seller meets with a new buyer. Our assumptions imply that α B (·) is strictly decreasing and α S (·) is strictly increasing in θ.
The flow of repeat meetings equals γ, which is the rate at which a matched buyer contacts his regular seller. In these meetings there is no asymmetric information about q since the seller always offers the same quality.
To summarize, all buyers (whether matched or unmatched) meet new sellers at the same rate α B (θ), and matched buyers additionally meet their regular sellers at rate γ.
A potential buyer of type z decides whether to participate in the market and, if so, his reservation quality for becoming matched with a new seller (the reservation quality of a matched buyer is, trivially, the quality that he receives from his regular seller). Let R z be the reservation quality of an unmatched type-z buyer andV z be his value of being unmatched in the market. A type-z buyer participates in the market if and only if
The outcome of buyers' actions is the measure of participating buyers B and the distribution H(·) of their reservation qualities.
A potential seller of type c decides whether to participate in the market and, if so, the quality that he offers. Steady state profits of a type-c seller offering quality q are:
where t(q) denotes the steady state flow of transactions when offering q and p − cq is the margin per transaction. A type-c seller enters the market if and only if
where q * (c) denotes his profit-maximizing quality.
The outcome of sellers' actions is the measure of participating sellers S and the distribution F (·) of offered qualities.
Definition 1 An equilibrium consists of the actions of buyers {B, H(·)} and the actions of sellers {S, F (·)} such that entry, reservation qualities and offered qualities are chosen optimally and the market is in steady state.
The Buyers
We derive buyers' optimal actions, taking as given the distribution of offered qualities F (·) and the number of participating sellers S.
Consider a buyer of type z who takes the behavior of sellers and other buyers as given.
When unmatched, the buyer meets a new seller at rate α B (θ). At the meeting he pays price p and receives quality x, randomly drawn from F (·). If the quality level x exceeds his reservation R z , the buyer matches with the seller, thereby obtaining capital gain
is the value of being matched with a seller offering x. The value of an unmatched type-z buyer satisfies:
(1)
When matched with a seller who offers quality q, three events might occur: (1) at rate γ, the buyer meets his regular seller, pays p and receives q;
(2) at rate δ, an exogenous shock destroys the match and the buyer becomes unmatched obtaining a (negative) capital gainV z − V z (q); and (3) at rate α B (θ), he meets a new seller, pays p and receives quality
x, drawn from the quality distribution F (·). If the new seller's quality exceeds q, then the buyer matches with the new seller and leaves his current seller, thereby obtaining capital
The value of a type-z buyer matched with a seller offering q satisfies:
( 2) The Proposition characterizes a buyer's decision to participate and his reservation qualities.
Proposition 2 Given F (·) and θ:
1. The value of participating in the market for a type-z buyer satisfies:
2. The optimal reservation quality is
3. There existsẑ (F, θ) such that a type-z buyer participates in the market if and only if z ≥ẑ(F, θ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that the reservation quality is decreasing in buyers' marginal utility. For a given q, a buyer's utility from consuming is increasing in z and, thus, so is his willingness to match with the sellers who offers q. Furthermore, R z does not depend on the distribution of offered qualities, F (·), because the arrival rate of new sellers is the same when matched and unmatched. 14 We now aggregate buyers' decisions, thereby obtaining the measure of participating buyers and the buyer-seller ratio θ. Conditional on the quality distribution F (·) and the number of participating sellers S, we have the following characterization of the market:
Proposition 3 Given F (·) and S:
, then there is no buyer entry: B = 0.
2. If p <z q 0 xdF (x), then there is a marginal buyer type z * ≤z such that a buyer participates in the market if and only if z ≥ z * .
The marginal buyer type is given by the solution to:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The Proposition's results are intuitive. If the average quality in the market is low enough that the most eager buyer receives no surplus from a purchase, then no buyers enter the market. 15 Otherwise, there is a unique marginal type such that buyers enter only if their marginal utility of consuming drugs is higher.
We now describe the distribution of buyer types and reservation qualities. Let z(R) denote the buyer type whose reservation quality equals R. Rearranging equation (4) we have:
Given z * , the equilibrium distribution of reservation qualities mirrors the distribution of marginal utilities. The corollary summarizes the results.
Corollary 4
The marginal buyer type z * completely characterizes buyers' behavior.
1. The measure of buyers in the market is:
The distribution of reservation qualities in the market retains the log-concavity ofM(·)
and satisfies:
The Sellers
This Section derives sellers' optimal decisions, taking as given the marginal buyer type z * , which determines the measure B of buyers who participate and the (log-concave) distribution of reservation qualities H(·).
An individual seller's transactions come from two sources: new buyers, who purchase from that seller for the first time, and repeat buyers, who purchased from that seller in the past and decided to match with him. The flow of transactions is t(q) = t N + t R (q), where t N represents sales to new buyers, and t R (q) represents sales to the seller's regular buyers.
Steady-state profits, therefore, equal:
The flow of new transactions equals the rate at which new buyers contact an individual seller, which does not depend on the quality offered:
The flow of repeat transactions to a seller who offers quality q depends on the number of regular buyers, denoted by l(q), and the rate γ at which these buyers contact their regular seller:
Unlike new transactions, the flow of repeat transactions depends on the seller's offered quality. A seller who offers quality q gains regular customers when he meets with unmatched buyers whose reservation is below q and with matched buyers whose regular seller offers less than q. Similarly, he loses his regular customers when they meet with a seller offering quality greater than q and when the match exogenously dissolves, which happens at rate δ.
We characterize sellers' actions in three steps. First, we derive some necessary conditions for the distribution of offered qualities. Second we derive an individual seller's profits. Third we characterize the full distribution of offered qualities and sellers' entry decisions.
In equilibrium, the quality distribution satisfies the following features:
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, the quality distribution F (·) is continuous on [0,q] and has support
The following Proposition characterizes the steady-state profits of a type-c seller, taking the action of buyers and other sellers as given.
Proposition 6
Given H(·), θ and F (·), the steady-state profits of a type-c seller who offers quality q are:
We characterize the optimal decisions of sellers, taking as given the measure of buyers B
and buyers' reservation distribution H(·).
Proposition 7 Given B and H(·),
1. Positive quality is always offered in the market. There is a unique marginal seller typē c such that sellers with c ≤c enter the market and offer quality q * (c), which is strictly decreasing in c.
2. The measure S 0 > 0 of sellers who offer zero quality is uniquely determined. S 0 > 0 if and only if the measure of potential sellers is low enough.
The subsequent quantitative analysis will focus on the case where cheating occurs in equilibrium (S 0 > 0) as this is the empirically relevant case.
Proposition 7 illustrates the importance of imperfect observability of quality and moral hazard for market outcomes: sellers with high cost of providing drugs participate in the market but specialize in cheating their buyers-i.e., offering zero quality-and still retain a positive flow of sales. In a market with perfect observability of quality, such sellers would not be in the market.
Corollary 8 Seller behavior is summarized as follows:
1. The measure of sellers in the market is S =SD(c) + S 0 .
The type distribution of sellers in the market who offer positive quality is
for c ≤c.
The quality distribution is F
(q) = 1 − (1 − F (0))D q * −1 (q) for q > 0 and F (0) = S 0 S .
Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a fixed point on the marginal buyer type. Given z * , the measure of participating buyers B and the distribution of their reservations H(·) are uniquely determined (Corollary 4). This, in turn, determines the marginal seller typec, the measure of sellers who enter the market S, (Proposition 7) and the quality distribution F (·) (Corollary 8).
Finally, F (·) and S determine the marginal buyer type (Proposition 3, equation (5)). The marginal type is defined on a closed and bounded set [0,z], and Proposition 9 follows.
Proposition 9 An equilibrium exists.
Quantitative Analysis
The model does not admit an analytic solution for all endogenous outcomes. Hence, we choose the parameters that best match moments of the data with the corresponding moments computed from the model's numerical solution. We then study the quantitative implications of the model evaluated at the estimated parameters.
Parametric Assumptions
We estimate the model using the data described in Section 3, assuming that they are generated from the model's steady state. We further assume that the empirical quality distribution obtained from STRIDE corresponds to the distribution F (·) that first-time buyers face. We set the unit of time to be one month, as this is the period over which we observe consumption frequencies in ADAM.
Unfortunately, the data lack some detailed information to identify all parameters. Therefore, we fix some values. Specifically, the discount rate r is traditionally difficult to identify, and we set it to r = .01. Moreover, since we use the normalized variable Pure Grams per $100, we set the price equal to p = $100. Furthermore, we set sellers' monthly opportunity cost K S to be $1, 500, which is broadly in line with the bottom of the distribution of drug dealers' earnings reported by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) .
We further make parametric assumptions about the distributions of buyers' and sellers'
heterogeneity. Specifically, we assume that the distributionM (·) of buyers' taste for crack cocaine z is a mixture distribution: a fraction λ has taste z = 0-i.e., they will never enter the market-and a fraction 1 − λ has taste z that follows a lognormal distribution with unknown parameters µ z and σ z ; hence, the maximum number of active buyers is (1 − λ)B.
Since the reservation quality of a buyer with type z > 0 is R z = p z , it follows that the distribution H (·) of reservation qualities is also lognormal with parameters µ R = log p − µ z and σ z .
Moreover, we assume that the distribution of the inverse of sellers' costs 1/c is a Pareto distribution with lower bound 1 c M and shape parameter ξ ≥ 1. This implies that the distribution of costs c is:D
and, thus, the truncated distribution of costs of active sellers equals
wherec is the cost of the marginal active seller that offers the lowest quality level q. The shape parameter ξ captures the dispersion of costs. If ξ = 1, the cost distribution is uniform.
As ξ increases, the relative number of high-cost sellers increases, and the cost distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels. As ξ goes to infinity, the cost distribution becomes degenerate at the upper bound. 16 We further assume that drug qualities q are measured with error. More specifically, we assume that the reported qualitiesq and the "true" qualities q are related as:
where ǫ is a measurement error. We assume that ǫ follows a lognormal distribution and restrict its mean to equal 1-i.e., measurement is unbiased-which implies that the parameters µ ǫ and σ ǫ of the lognormal distribution satisfy µ ǫ = −.5σ 2 ǫ . The assumption of measurement error on wages is quite common in the literature that structurally estimates search models of the labor market. In our application, it is plausible as well, and it could also account for some unobserved seller behavior that the model does not consider (i.e., price discrimination), thereby allowing us to fit the quality distribution better.
For example, as Lemma 5 highlights, the model implies a gap in the quality distribution between the complete rip-offs q * = 0 and the minimum positive quality q. Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution displays this qualitative feature, and the measurement ǫ allows it to more precisely match its magnitude. Similarly, Figure 1 shows that the quality distribution displays a long right tail, and the measurement ǫ allows the model to capture some of these high-quality transactions.
Finally, we explicitly model the selection into the ADAM sample. Specifically, we assume that a buyer of type z is in ADAM if log(z) + η ≥ 0, where η is a random variable which is independent of z and is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean µ η and standard deviation σ η . Hence, this selection equation highlights that buyers with higher preferences for drugs (and, thus, greater drug consumption) are more likely to be in the ADAM dataset. Appendix B reports the details of the derivation of the density of drug users' preferences z in ADAM; we will use this density to compute simulated moments that we match to their empirical counterparts. 16 We could non-parametrically estimate the distribution D (c) from the empirical distribution of q for q > 0, as D (c) = 1−F (q) 1−F (0) . However, we specify a parametric distribution for D (c) to perform the counterfactual out-of-sample analyses of Section 5.4.
Estimation and Identification
We estimate the vector of parameters ψ = α, γ, δ, K B , µ R , σ R ,c, ξ, σ ǫ , µ η , σ η , λ using a minimum-distance estimator that matches key moments of the data with the corresponding moments of the model. More precisely, for any value of these parameters, we solve the model of Section 4 to find its equilibrium: the mass B of active buyers and their distribution of reservation qualities H(·), and the mass S of active sellers and their distribution F (·) of offered qualities. We then calculate two sets of moments, one that we match to a set of moments computed from the STRIDE dataset, and one that we match to a set of moments computed from the ADAM dataset.
The first set m 1 (ψ) is composed of these moments of the offered quality distribution F (·):
1. The fraction of rip-offs q =q = 0. 17 2. The mean of quality forq > 0.
3. The standard deviation of quality forq > 0.
4. The median of quality forq > 0.
5. The skewness of quality forq > 0.
6. The kurtosis of quality forq > 0.
Moreover, at each value of the parameters, we simulate buyer-seller meetings and consumption patterns (i.e., the α B , δ and γ shocks), using the distributions of preferences z and buyer-seller matches that take into account the selection into ADAM (see Appendix B). We then compute the second set m 2 (ψ) composed of these moments:
1. The fraction of individuals who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days.
2. The fraction of users who made their last purchase of crack cocaine from their regular dealer, among those who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days (in the simulation, a purchase from a regular dealer is defined as a purchase from the same seller as the previous purchase).
3. The average number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days and made their last purchase from their regular dealer. 4. The average number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days and did not make their last purchase from their regular dealer. 5. The standard deviation of the number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days and make their last purchase from their regular dealer.
6. The standard deviation of the number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days and did not made their last purchase from their regular dealer.
We further add to this set of moments two aggregate statistics that identify the parameters that determine the selection into the ADAM sample and the fraction λ of the population who has no taste for crack cocaine. reports that the fraction of non-institutionalized individuals aged 12 and older who selfreport to have consumed crack cocaine in the past year equals 0.7 percent. Because the NSDUH does not include arrestees, who are more likely to consume drugs, and includes young individuals aged between 12 and 15, whom we do not include among our potential buyers, we set this fraction to be equal to one percent in the estimation. 19
The minimum-distance estimator chooses the parameter vector ψ that minimizes the criterion function The identification of the model is similar to that of structural search models of the labor market which follow the framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998); see, for example, Bontemps et al. (1999) . Specifically, although the model is highly nonlinear, so that (almost) all parameters affect all outcomes, the identification of some parameters relies on some key moments in the data.
The moments of the quality distribution identify the parameters of the distribution D(·) of sellers' heterogeneity and of the distribution of the measurement error, and they contribute to the identification of the parameters of the distribution M(·) of buyers' heterogeneity. 20
More precisely, as in structural search models of the labor market, the data sometimes display events that should not occur according to the model, and these "zero-probability events"
identify the variance of the measurement error. In search models of the labor markets, these events are job-to-job transitions that feature a wage decrease; instead, our model implies a gap in the quality distribution between q = 0 and q that is larger than that observed in the data-i.e., no seller offers a small positive quality, as this quality is strictly more expensive than zero quality and does not induce buyers to purchase again from the seller offering it-and this gap identifies the variance of the measurement error.
The moments of buyers' consumptions identify the meeting rates α B and γ and the destruction rate δ, and they contribute to the identification of the parameters of the distribution M(·) of buyers' heterogeneity. The fraction of individuals who purchased drugs in the last 30 days and the arrest rate identify the parameters of the distribution of the unobservable η that contributes to the selection into the ADAM sample. 21 From the distribution of buyers' heterogeneity, we then recover buyers' cost K B . The estimates of the parameters of the distribution of buyers' heterogeneity imply that almost all individuals have taste z equal to zero, and, thus, the market for crack cocaine is limited in size, presumably because crack cocaine is one of the most addictive and dangerous drugs. Of those individuals with positive preferences, buyers with taste z ≥ z * = 34.39 are active in the market, and among those active, the average taste is approximately equal to 43 and the standard deviation is equal to 5.72. The parametersc and ξ of sellers' cost distribution imply that the range of sellers' cost is [0, 29.83] , but their average cost is 27.55, as ξ = 12.09 implies that almost all sellers have costs quite close to the upper boundc.
Estimates
Moreover, the comparison between buyers' average valuation and sellers' average cost implies
that the surplus of each pure gram traded equals approximately 15 dollars.
Finally, we estimate that σ ǫ equals 0.41, which means that the variance of the measure-ment error equals 0.18. The estimates imply that the variance of the "true" quality q equals 1.28, indicating that the model without any error captures quite well the dispersion of drug quality observed in the data, and the measurement error improves the fit, in particular by "filling the gap" between q = 0 and q, which the estimated model sets at 2.54. 22
Model Fit
Before considering some broader implications of our results, we examine the fit of the estimated model. Table 3 presents a comparison between the empirical moments and the moments calculated from the model at preliminary parameters. Overall, the model matches the moments of the quality distribution quite well. The largest discrepancy is in the fraction of purchases from regular dealers, which we observe in the data less frequently than the model predicts. Nonetheless, the model captures both the fraction of rip-offs and the higher-order moments of the quality distribution well. The model matches the moments of the distribution of buyers' consumptions slightly less precisely than those of the quality distribution, but, overall, it captures the difference in consumption rates between matched and unmatched buyers well. Moreover, the model matches perfectly the fraction of individuals purchasing drugs in the ADAM sample, the fraction of individuals consuming crack cocaine in the population as well as the arrest rate, indicating that our empirical model captures very well the over-representation of drug users into the ADAM sample.
To further appreciate how the model compares to the quality data in, perhaps, a moreintuitive way, Figure 2 displays the histogram of the quality distribution obtained from a model simulation using the estimated parameters reported in Table 2 . The comparison with the empirical distribution of Figure 1 corroborates that the model does well at matching the qualitative and quantitative features of the distribution of drug quality.
Model Implications
The estimated parameters reported in Table 2 imply that 15.6 percent of all sellers rip their buyers off by choosing q = 0. For sellers with costs 0 ≤ c ≤c = 29.83, q * (c) is the solution to the differential equation (11) in Appendix A: sellers' quality choices are strictly decreasing in their costs, as Lemma 7 says. The estimated parameters imply that sellers' positive qualities lie in the interval [2.54, 3.67]. Hence, the model implies a non-trivial dispersion of drug qualities, and the measurement error helps to match the large dispersion. Lemma 5, most notably the mass point at zero quality. Of course, no matched buyer purchases zero quality from his regular dealer. Moreover, as buyers move up over time in the offered quality distribution by switching to sellers that offer higher-quality drugs, they are more likely to be matched to higher-quality sellers. Hence, the cumulative G (q) first-order stochastically dominates the cumulative F (q) . Matched buyers consume drugs that have an average quality ofg (q) dq = 3.21, whereas unmatched buyers consume drugs that have an average quality of q 0 qf (q) dq = 2.60, indicating that buyers' switching behavior and buyer-seller relationships have a substantial effect on the qualities that regular buyers consume relative to the distribution of qualities that first-time buyers consume.
Counterfactual Analyses
In this Section, we use our model to quantitatively analyze two key features of illegal markets: 1) the effect of moral hazard on market outcomes; and 2) the effect of changing penalties on market outcomes.
Both analyses are out-of-sample and, thus, require that we specify the measures B and S of potential buyers and potential sellers, along with the functional form of the matching function m(B, S) that determines the aggregate number of new meetings between B active buyers and S active sellers.
We set the measure B of potential buyers to 228 million, which, as we mentioned before when reporting the fraction of individuals arrested, is the U.S population over 15 years of age reported in July 2002 (the midpoint of our sample period) by the U.S. Census. We set the measure S of potential sellers to five percent of potential buyers B. Our theoretical model imposes an upper bound on this measure in order to match the fraction of rip-offs observed in the data (see Proposition 7), and our choice satisfies this restriction. 23 Following Corollary 8, the measure S allows us to recover the upper bound c M of the aggregate distribution of costsD(c).
We further assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form:
where ω is the efficiency of the matching function. With our estimated parameters, we can
where we estimated α B using the ADAM data, we obtained B from the fraction of the population consuming crack cocaine, and we inferred S from sellers' free-entry condition.
(In the following counterfactual analyses, we report quantitative results without measurement errors on drug quality.)
The Role of Sellers' Moral Hazard
In order to understand the quantitative role of moral hazard on market outcomes, we modify the baseline model by letting buyers observe quality before making a purchase, and compute the new equilibrium. This counterfactual highlights how the observability of q affects buyers' and sellers' incentives and, thus, the equilibrium distribution of quality q.
Appendix C reports the full derivation of the equilibrium.
When quality is observable, a buyer who meets a new seller has two decisions to make, after observing q: whether to consume and whether to match. Regardless of whether the buyer is currently matched or not, he makes a purchase when the instantaneous payoff zq − p is positive. The decision to match is similar to that of the baseline model: if matched, the buyer chooses between matching with the new seller or returning to his regular seller, after potentially taking advantage of the consumption opportunity; if unmatched, the buyer chooses between matching with the new seller and remaining unmatched, as consuming and remaining unmatched is not optimal.
Hence, the value functions of a type-z buyer satisfy:
Simple calculations suggest that the reservation quality for consuming is the same as the reservation quality for matching (see Appendix C for details).
Quality observability affects sellers' payoffs because new buyers make a purchase only
if the instantaneous payoff is positive. Therefore, the flow of transactions to new buyers for a seller offering quality q is equal to the meeting rate with new buyers α S (θ) times the probability that the buyer's reservation is below q, H(q):
The flow of sellers' transactions with regular buyers t R (q) is determined in an equivalent way to the baseline case. Steady-state profits are:
Sellers' incentives differ from the baseline case and, thus, their choices do as well. Specifically, offering zero quality yields negative instantaneous payoff to all buyers and, thus, sellers no longer offer complete rip-offs. Therefore, the distribution of offered quality does not feature a mass point at zero. More generally, the flow of new customers depends on the quality offered, since buyers with low levels of z might choose not to purchase from low-q sellers.
We quantitatively assess the effect of eliminating moral hazard by introducing the estimated parameters in the observable quality model. We consider two separate cases: 1) a partial-equilibrium case in which the measures of participating buyers and sellers are unchanged relative to the baseline case, but the agents make optimal decisions in the new information environment; 2) a general-equilibrium case in which, in addition to the partialequilibrium optimizations, buyers and sellers also make optimal entry decisions. We believe that the partial-equilibrium case is useful to focus exclusively on the effects of sellers' moral hazard due the imperfect observability of drugs' purity. 42.703 [38.938; 48.341] 39.500 [37.531; 45.048] Notes-This table reports market outcomes in the counterfactual cases in which buyers can observe drugs' purity before purchasing. Table 4 reports market outcomes for the counterfactuals of observable quality for the partial-equilibrium case and the general-equilibrium case. Overall, market outcomes differ substantially when buyers observe drug purity and when they do not. Moreover, the quantitative effects are very similar in the partial-and general-equilibrium cases.
Specifically, the partial-equilibrium case highlights that the average offered quality increases by approximately 20 percent and the standard deviation of quality decreases by approximately 75 percent relative to the baseline case. Moreover, zero-purity drugs disappear from the market when quality is observable, as we discussed above. Overall, this counterfactual indicates that unobservable quality, rather than search frictions, is the main determinant of the observed dispersion of quality. Finally, a larger fraction of buyers is matched to a regular seller, thereby increasing their number of purchases and consumption by approximately five and ten percent, respectively.
The general equilibrium case highlights additional effects relative to the partial-equilibrium case. First, buyers receive higher quality than in the baseline case, thereby increasing buy-ers' participation. Second, the intensified competition among sellers reduces their profits relative to the baseline case, thereby decreasing sellers' participation. As a result, the buyerseller ratio increases relative to the baseline case, attenuating the partial-equilibrium effects.
Overall, the increase in the number of buyers together with the increase in their drug consumption leads to an increase in the aggregate consumption of pure drugs by approximately 7.5 percent relative to the baseline case.
The results reported in Table 4 provide some insights on how outcomes would differ if drugs markets were legal. Buyers' imperfect information is one key way in which our model captures an illegal market, because, in legal markets for similar commodities (i.e., tea, coffee, cigarettes, alcohol), buyers are better (albeit perhaps not fully) informed about the quality of products that they are purchasing. While a full legalization counterfactual requires many additional assumptions (for example, on the destruction rate δ, the efficiency of the matching process and the entry costs K B and K S ), our analysis illustrates that the average quality of drugs will increase if drugs markets were legal because of buyers' better information.
The Role of Penalties
The United States has witnessed a large increase of policies and penalties on buyers and sellers of drugs in the last 30 years. The principal aim of these changes was to disrupt the market for narcotics. Legal penalties on drug trade obviously affect sellers' costs K S and buyers' costs K B and, thus, in this Section, we use our model to understand how these costs K S and K B affect market outcomes. 24 We estimated our model on data from 2001-2003, when penalties were high, and, thus, we now perform two counterfactuals with lower costs in order to understand their effects on market outcomes. More specifically, in the first one, we decrease sellers' cost K S by 15 percent (i.e., from $1, 500 to $1, 350) relative to the baseline case of Section 4 with ex-ante unobservable quality; in the second one, we decrease buyers' cost K B by 15 percent relative to the baseline case. Table 5 reports the quantitative values of market outcomes for the two counterfactuals cases, displaying interesting results. The effect of lower penalties on sellers (i.e., a drop in K S ) on market participation is intuitive: the number of sellers is 16-percent higher. Thus, the rate at which buyers meet with new sellers, α B (θ) is higher, as well. 37.976 [36.243; 42.741] 38.255 [35.984; 43.682] Notes-This table reports market outcomes in the counterfactual cases in which buyers' cost K B and sellers' cost K S are 15-percent lower than in the baseline case, respectively.
The effect on the average offered quality, however, is quite striking: the average quality of a new purchase is lower, despite lower sellers' costs. The reason is that a larger value of α B (θ) means that the match between a buyer and a seller is, on average, shorter-lived. In turn, this reduction lowers sellers' value of forming long-term relationships with new buyers relative to the value of ripping them off and, thus, the proportion of rip-offs increases. Our quantitative exercise shows that, at the estimated parameter values, the proportion of sellers who specialize in rip-offs is approximately 13-percent higher (i.e., it increases from 15.59 to 17.68 percentage points), the average offered quality is 3.5-percent lower, and the standard deviation is 4.5-percent higher than in the baseline case.
This decrease in drug quality tends to decrease the number of active buyers in the market, whereas a higher meeting rate tends to increase it. As a result of these opposing forces, the equilibrium number of buyers decreases by a small amount, two percent. Similarly, the lower quality of drugs implies that the fraction of matched buyers decreases, as well as their average number of purchases and their average pure quantity of crack consumed. However, the magnitudes of all these changes are negligible-i.e., all these change by at most two percent relative to the baseline case.
Similarly, a 15-percent reduction in buyers' participation cost K B leads to a small (i.e., one percent) increase in the number of buyers. A larger market size attracts a larger number of sellers (higher by 7.5 percent), indicating that the elasticity of supply is larger than the elasticity of demand. Therefore, the buyer-seller ratio is, again, lower than in the baseline case, thereby increasing buyers' meeting rate α B (θ). Hence, sellers have stronger incentives to make quick profits by selling q = 0, decreasing the offered qualities. The last column of Table 5 reports that these effects on the drug quality distribution are quantitatively sizable:
the fraction of rip-offs increase by 36 percent, decreasing the average drug quality by 5.9 percent, and increasing the standard deviation of drug quality by 10 percent relative to the baseline case. However, because of the two contrasting effects-i.e., the increase in the meeting rate and the decrease in drug quality-the overall effects on the number of matched buyers, as well as on buyers' purchases and consumptions, are again negligible-i.e., all these change by at most one percent relative to the baseline case.
Overall, the results reported in Table 5 highlight that changes in penalties have larger effects on the distribution of drugs offered on the market than on buyers' purchase and consumption patterns, as buyers' switching between sellers allows them to adjust their consumption. Hence, these results suggest that it may be difficult to infer buyers' consumptions exclusively from samples of drug purchases.
Moreover, the results further highlight the role of buyers' incomplete information at the time of purchase, as sellers' moral hazard is fundamental to this, perhaps counterintuitive, relation between lower penalties-sellers' penalties, in particular-and lower quality. Specifically, when buyers have perfect information about quality in a frictional product market (e.g., the product-market version of Burdett and Mortensen, 1998), an increase in buyers' meeting rate α B (θ) unambiguously increases competition among sellers, thereby leading to an improvement in buyers' terms of trade-i.e. an increase in the average offered quality.
Finally, the results indicate that increasing penalties may help strengthen the long-term relationships between buyers and sellers that help overcome illegal markets' informational problems. Hence, our analysis suggests that increasing penalties may have contributed to the observed increased purity of retail drugs in the U.S. Similarly, the UN office for Drugs and Crime reports that price-adjusted purity of drugs is lower in Europe than in the United States, 25 whereas penalties for market participants-buyers, in particular-are lower in Europe than in the United States. Of course, there are potentially many other differences among U.S. markets over time, and between the U.S. market and the European one. Nonetheless, we find interesting that our model is consistent with these across-market differences.
Conclusions
This paper develops a framework to understand illicit drug markets. We focus on two key characteristics of illegal markets: 1) the inability to verify/contract the quality of the good; and 2) penalties on market participants. Buyers' inability to verify the quality of the good creates a trade-off for sellers. On the one hand, they can offer low-quality drugs, thus maximizing short-term profits. On the other hand, they can offer high-quality drugs, thus inducing buyers to purchase from them again. In equilibrium, a distribution of quality levels persists.
We estimate the model using data on the U.S. market for crack cocaine. The model fits the data well. Our counterfactual analysis implies that buyers' inability to verify the quality of the good and, thus, sellers' moral hazard reduce the average and increase the dispersion of drug purity, thereby reducing drug consumption. Moreover, the estimated model implies that increasing penalties may increase the purity and the affordability of the drugs traded 
APPENDICES A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. We determine the reservation quality of an unmatched buyer by equating the value of remaining unmatched with the value of becoming matched at R z :
which implies equation (4). Integrating by parts, the value of being unmatched satisfies:
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to q, we obtain
.
Combining the previous two equations yields equation (3). The value of participating in the market is negative for buyers who receive no utility from consuming and is strictly increasing in a buyer's marginal utility of consumption:
The value of participating can be made arbitrarily large by increasing z; therefore, a buyer participates in the market only if his type is high enough.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Fix a type-z buyer and consider his value of participating in the market as a function of the buyer-seller ratio, θ. If θ is large, type-z buyer never meets with a seller (lim θ→∞ α B (θ) = 0) and, thus, his value of participating is strictly below the entry cost:
The value of participating in the market is strictly decreasing in θ:
If θ is small, a buyer meets with a seller arbitrarily often (lim θ→0 α B (θ) = ∞) and, thus, the value of participating satisfies:
and the buyer participates if:
Therefore, regardless of θ, a type-z buyer never participates in the market if z q 0 xdF (x) ≤ p. As a result, there is no buyer entry (B = 0) whenz q 0 xdF (x) ≤ p, which proves part 1 of the Proposition.
Whenz q 0 xdF (x) > p, a type-z buyer participates if z q 0 xdF (x) > p and if θ is low enough. Conversely, given θ, there is a z(θ), with z(θ) q 0 xdF (x) > p, such that
so that a buyer participates if and only if z ≥ z(θ) and the measure of buyers equals B =B(1 − M (z(θ))). Given S, this leads to
We now show that, given S and F (·), there is a unique z * such that z * = z(θ(z * )). We show that as z * increases, the participation value of the marginal buyer type increases after taking into account the effect on θ:
Therefore, there is a unique z * such that the unmatched value of the marginal buyer is exactly equal to K B and it is defined by equation (5). This completes the proof of parts 2 and 3.
Proof of Lemma 5. For q ∈ [0, R) we have t(q) = t N , which implies that π c (0) > π c (q) for q ∈ (0, R). Therefore, either q = 0 or q ≥ q for some q ≥ R and F is constant (and, hence, continuous) on [0, q]. If q >R, then t(q) = t(R) for q ∈ [R, q] which implies that π c (R) > π c (q) for q ∈ (R, q]. Therefore, q ≤R. Standard arguments (as in Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) prove continuity on [q,q].
Proof of Proposition 6.
We determine the number of unmatched buyers and their type distribution using the fact that, in steady state, the flow of buyers into and out of the matched state must be equal. Let n(R) denote the number of buyers who are unmatched and whose type is less than R. The total number of unmatched buyers is n(R) ≡n. An unmatched buyer of type R becomes matched after transacting with a seller who offers above-reservation quality, which occurs at rate α B (θ)(1 − F (R)). A matched buyer exits the matched state when his match is exogenously destroyed, which occurs at rate δ. In steady state: F (R) ) .
Hence, the mass n(R) satisfies:
and, thus, the mass of matched buyers is:
Let G(·) denote the received quality distribution for matched buyers. The mass of matched buyers receiving quality up to q is given by (B −n)G(q). An unmatched type-R buyer flows into this group if R ≤ q, and he samples a seller who offers quality less than q, which occurs at rate α B (θ)(F (q) − F (R)). A buyer flows out of this group if the match is exogenously destroyed or if he samples a new seller whose quality if greater than q, which occurs at rate δ + α B (θ)(1 − F (q)). Equating these flows yields: F (q) ) .
Thus, G ′ (q) satisfies (we assume, and later verify, that F is differentiable):
The number of buyers who are matched with a seller offering q is (B −n)G ′ (q), and the number of sellers offering quality q is SF ′ (q). Hence, the number of matched buyers per seller at quality q is:
which implies that the flow of transactions from regular buyers is:
Combining results completes the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that all sellers who participate in the market offer q = 0. In equilibrium, their profits are equal to the entry cost K S and they are given by π c (0) = α B (θ)θp.
Consider a seller with cost c ′ who deviates offers q ′ =R. His profits are
which is strictly greater than K S for c ′ close enough to zero. Since the support of seller types is (0, ∞), such a type exists and strictly prefers to participate in the market. Therefore, F (0) = 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. Take as given the set of sellers who participate in the market and consider sellers 1 and 2 with c 1 > c 2 who choose quality q 1 and q 2 . We show that q 2 ≥ R ⇒ q 2 > q 1 and q 2 = 0 ⇒ q 1 = 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that R ≤ q 2 ≤ q 1 . Since seller 1 chooses q 1 over q 2 and seller 2 chooses quality q 2 over q 1 :
which, combined with the assumption c 1 > c 2 , yields a contradiction and therefore q 2 > q 1 . Going through the same steps, it is immediate that q 2 = 0 ⇒ q 1 = 0.
Combining the two results, there is a marginal seller typec > 0 such that sellers with c >c offer q = 0 and sellers with c ≤c offer strictly positive quality, which is strictly decreasing in their type. Furthermore, notice that profits are strictly decreasing in type for sellers with c ∈ (0,c), since a lower-cost seller can always mimic a higher-cost seller's action and earn higher profits than him.
The free entry condition specifies that the profits of participating sellers are weakly greater than the entry cost. This implies that the profits of the marginal seller type are equal to K S , all sellers with c <c participate in the market and the measure of sellers who offer positive quality is S + (c) =SD(c). Let S 0 denote the measure of sellers who participate in the market and offer q = 0, where S 0 ≥ 0. Their profits do not depend on their type and satisfy
which holds with equality if S 0 > 0.
We derive the marginal seller type and the measure of sellers offering zero quality in three steps. First, we characterize the optimal quality offered by the marginal seller conditional on his type and S 0 . Second, given S 0 , we show that there a unique marginal typec such that his profits are equal to K S . Third, we characterize S 0 .
The profits of the seller who offers the lowest positive quality (the marginal seller) satisfy:
π c (q) = α S (θ)(p − cq) 1 + γδH(q)
where F (0) = S 0 S and S = S + (c) + S 0 . Denote the optimal choice for a type-c seller who offers the lowest positive quality by q(c) and note that, necessarily, q(c) ≥ R. q(c) is determined by the root of:
where the the log-concavity of H(·) guarantees that the second-order condition is negative:
We show that, given S 0 , there is a unique marginal typec such that his profits are exactly equal to K S when he offers q(c). Notice that π c (q(c)) is greater than K S when c is low, is lower than K S when c is high and is strictly decreasing in c:
In the last equation, the first term is zero by the envelope condition, the second term is negative because higher costs reduce margins and the third term is negative because an increase inc increases the measure of participating sellers which reduces a seller's arrival rate of new buyers. Therefore, there is a uniquec such that π(q(c)) = K S , given S 0 .
To determine S 0 , note that an increase inS leads to an increase in S + (c). Suppose, by contradiction, that this is not true and that the marginal type drops enough to outweigh the increase in the measure of potential sellers. In that case, however, the (new) marginal type's profits will be strictly greater than K S because he has lower costs and faces fewer competing sellers. As a result, given S 0 an increase inS leads to a drop in the buyer-seller ratio, θ.
DefineŜ as the measure of potential sellers such that equation (8) holds with equality when S =Ŝ and S 0 = 0. IfS ≥Ŝ then S 0 = 0, S = S + (c) andc is determined by equating (10) to zero and (9) to K S . IfS <Ŝ, then the measure of sellers S is determined by α S ( B S )p = K S ,c is determined by equating (10) to zero and (9) to K S , and S 0 = S − S + (c).
We now determine q * (c) for c <c. We assume that an optimal schedule q * (c) exists, and we rewrite the profits of a type-c seller as if he decides which other type c ′ to imitate rather than which quality to offer-i.e., to imitate type c ′ , who offers quality q ′ = q * (c ′ ). We have: π c (c ′ ) = α B (θ)θ(p − cq * (c ′ )) 1 + γδH(q * (c ′ )) (δ + α B (θ)(1 − F (0))D(c ′ )) 2 , where D(·) is the distribution of sellers in the market who offer positive quality:
The advantage of formulating the choice in terms of c ′ rather than q ′ is that the term in Proof. Buyers with z ≤ p q have no benefit from participating in the market and never enter. Consider a buyer with z > p q . Whether this buyer enters the market depends on how quickly he trades, which, in turn, depends on the buyer-seller ratio θ. We have:
Therefore, for each buyer of type z with z > p q , there is a unique θ(z) such that he participates if θ ≤ θ(z) and stays out otherwise. Hence, the measure of buyers in the market is:
Given S, this leads to θ(z(θ)) =B
(1 −M (z(θ))) S .
We now show that, given S and F (·), there is a unique z * * such that z * * = z(θ(z * * )). We show that as z * * increases, the participation value of the marginal type increases after taking into account the effect on θ: drV z * * dz * * = ∂rV z * * ∂z * * + ∂rV z * * ∂θ −BM ′ (z * * ) > 0.
Therefore, there is a unique z * * such that the unmatched value of the marginal buyer equals K B , as in equation (13).
As in the baseline model, the distribution of reservation qualities obtains:
where R = R z = p z andR = R z * * = p z * * .
C.2 The Sellers
We derive sellers' actions, taking as given the measure of buyers who participate B and the distribution of reservation qualities H(·).
Free entry determines the measure S and type distribution D(·) of sellers in the market, subject to flow participation cost K S . The problem of a seller of type c is to choose a level of quality q * * (c) that maximizes his steady-state profits, which depend on the margin per transaction (p − cq) and the steady-state flow of transactions (t(q)): π c (q) = (p − cq)t(q).
We first derive some necessary conditions on the distribution of offered qualities: Therefore, we have:
dH (x) .
We now characterize G(·). The mass of matched buyers receiving quality up to q is (B −n)G(q). An unmatched type-R buyer flows into this group if R ≤ q and he samples a seller who offers quality less than q, which occurs at rate α B (θ)(F (q) − F (R)). A buyer flows out of this group if the match is exogenously destroyed or if he samples a new seller whose quality if greater than q, which occurs at rate δ + α B (θ)(1 − F (q)). Equating these flows yields:
Rearranging, we obtain:
Combining results completes the proof of the Proposition. We characterize the distribution of offered qualities, F (·) and the number of sellers who enter the market, taking as given the number of buyers B and the distribution of their reservation values H(·).
Lemma 13 Consider sellers 1 and 2 with costs c 1 and c 2 and denote their actions by q 1 and q 2 and their profits by π 1 and π 2 . Then: c 1 > c 2 ⇒ q 2 > q 1 and c 1 > c 2 ⇒ π 2 > π 1 .
Proof. The proof for qualities is by contradiction. Suppose that c 1 > c 2 and q 2 ≤ q 1 . Recall that profits are given by π c (q) = (p − cq)t(q). Seller 1 chooses q 1 over q 2 and seller 2 chooses q 2 over q 1 . Therefore:
(p − c 1 q 1 )t(q 1 ) ≥ p − c 1 q 2 )t(q 2 ⇒ p(t(q 1 ) − t(q 2 )) ≥ c 1 t(q 1 )q 1 − t(q 2 )q 2 (p − c 2 q 2 )t(q 2 ) ≥ (p − c 2 q 1 )t(q 1 ) ⇒ p(t(q 1 ) − t(q 2 )) ≤ c 2 (t(q 1 )q 1 − t(q 2 )q 2 ). which yields the desired contradiction, after noting that c 1 > c 2 .
Regarding profits, note that:
π 1 = (p − c 1 q 1 t(q 1 )) < (p − c 2 q 1 )t(q 1 ) ≤ (p − c 2 q 2 )t(q 2 ) = π 2 which completes the proof.
